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I. Introduction 
Asbestos liability has challenged the tort system since it 
became clear that exposure to asbestos caused serious, often fatal 
diseases. Professor Fraley in her Comment has, among other 
trenchant observations, nicely shown how information on the 
causal link was established.1 In my Comment, I wish to make 
three short points that will add some context to Flinn’s fine 
Note.2  
First I make a few general reports from the battlefield on the 
asbestos litigation wars described in the Note. The term “war” is 
appropriate. Battles have been waged in the courtrooms and 
legislatures over decades on behalf of claimants with devastating 
diseases that are associated with exposure to asbestos fibers. 
Multiple manufacturers employing the mineral have been sued. 
In the ensuing imbroglio of asbestos claims, along with other 
high-impact claims, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, motor 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.  
 1. See Jill M. Fraley, Comment, Knowledge Circles and the Duty of Care, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 792 (2014) (describing the uneven distribution of 
knowledge regarding the toxicity of asbestos). 
 2. See generally Meghan E. Flinn, Note, A Continuing War with Asbestos: 
The Stalemate Among State Courts on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos 
Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707 (2014). 
760 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 759 (2014) 
vehicles, and other toxic substances have formed the rich tapestry 
of modern torts law.3 These high-impact claims constitute the 
bulk of actions and most of the damages sought by the persons in 
the tort system. Tort law would be a quiet backwater except for 
litigation around these high-impact claims.  
Flinn shows us the high incidence of asbestos litigation, its 
claim frequency, and claim severity.4 She demonstrates that after 
years of battles, settlements, and the establishment of trusts 
designed to afford compensation, it looked as though the war was 
coming to an end.5 It may have been surmised that asbestos 
litigation would yield its place in the pantheon of high-impact tort 
claims. But the energy of the claims had not run its course. Like 
Napoleon returning from Elba, the war is resumed. Flinn would 
like to declare a Waterloo through her suggestion for quiet in 
these claims.6 After these decades of litigation, it is perfectly 
understandable that peace has its value and that claims coming 
from exposure to asbestos brought to the home need to be brought 
to a resolution.  
Flinn documents that courts, when faced with these claims, 
have been divided in finding liability.7 Some have decided that 
liability is a step too far; others have determined that the claims 
are meritorious. Flinn has stepped into the breach. Noting 
carefully and exhaustively the struggles of the courts in drawing 
boundaries to liability, she sees that a national legislative 
response is fraught with problems.8 Acutely, she perceives that 
the states have different problems in different degrees of 
severity.9 Congress too has shown a penchant for logrolling10 and 
                                                                                                     
 3. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS 
OF REFORM 152 (1995) (discussing examples of products liability). 
 4. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 709 (providing an introduction of the 
asbestos litigation crisis). 
 5. See id. at 709–10 (discussing the current state of asbestos litigation).  
 6. See id. at 757 (calling for an “end” to “this legal nightmare”).  
 7. See id. at 711–14 (outlining the courts’ various approaches to take-
home asbestos litigation). 
 8. See id. at 752–53 (discussing the ways in which the federal government 
has attempted to control the mass of litigation brought about by occupational 
exposure to asbestos).  
 9. See id. at 755 (suggesting that state legislatures should respond to the 
problem of asbestos litigation in accordance with their connection to it).  
 10. The term “logrolling” refers to a “mutual exchange of favors, especially 
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catering to special interests in the high-stakes game of regulating 
the asbestos claims process.11 A state-by-state solution accounts 
for regional differences and can measure more accurately the 
issues of the class of persons who merit recovery. The federal 
system, which allows states to experiment and test models for 
recovery that may inspire fellow states, also supports this 
solution.12 Removing of claims from state dockets is of public 
importance in the context of tight public revenues. State courts 
ought, in a sensitive manner, to be able to weigh claimants’ 
legitimate demands for compensation against the public interest 
in quieting claims for asbestos-related diseases. Legislatures 
have an institutional competence to regulate claims. They may 
cut the Gordian knot of litigation and come to a solution that 
weighs the interests more broadly. As elegant as Flinn’s solution 
may be, one last gauntlet must be run. I have no doubt that some 
claimants will be aggrieved and seek to mount a constitutional 
challenge to the legislation. The challenge may proceed under the 
United States Constitution or state constitutions.  
State tort reform has gathered pace, fueled by concerns about 
affordability and availability of liability insurance. Accumulating 
legislation has often been challenged on the basis that it violates 
state constitutional provisions.13 The Kentucky Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Wilson14 adopted the notion of jural rights derived 
from the common law to limit reform.15 Other courts have 
nullified tort law.16 
                                                                                                     
among lawmakers.” WEBSTER’S NEW POCKET DICTIONARY 189 (Johnathan L. 
Goldman ed., 2000). 
 11. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 751–53 (discussing the various congressional 
attempts to handle asbestos litigation).  
 12. See State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 260 (Ky. 1998) 
(considering whether a Kentucky statute that limited punitive damages violated 
“one or more provisions of the Constitution of Kentucky”). 
 14. 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998). 
 15. See id. at 269 (determining that the Kentucky statute on punitive 
damages violated the jural rights doctrine and was therefore unconstitutional). 
 16. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1104 (Ill. 1997) 
(declaring the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 unconstitutional under 
the Illinois constitution); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 
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This may be particularly the case if a court agrees with the 
reasoning of Professor John Goldberg, who argues from the roots 
of tort liability a constitutional right in tortious recourse.17 Part 
of Flinn’s plan is to place claimants in different states on 
different legal footings.18 Immediately, equal protection is 
implicated. I too favor a legislative solution that sets up a 
tribunal, federal or state, that may deal with these and other 
claims arising from asbestos exposure. Constitutional attacks will 
also loom in my suggestions. The maintenance of the claims, 
although in a different forum, fortifies them more robustly 
against attack because individual rights are preserved. I do not 
wish to pursue this point on the constitutionality of Flinn’s 
institutional reform, although, as her ideas percolate, the issue 
will be salient. Let me proceed to my three points. 
In Part II, I stress the role of tort law as a remedial machine 
that acts to force information about the causes of accidents and 
diseases. The problem of ignorance is especially acute when the 
law deals with the etiology of diseases. A person will have little 
information that tells him or her that the cause of the disease is 
tortious. Proof of negligence in accidents may sometimes call for 
judicial innovation, but gaps in proof pertaining to causation are 
perplexing when the injury claimed is disease. Yet, if the law of 
torts is to perform its function of correcting wrongful harms and 
internalizing the costs of harmful products, it is vital that tort 
doctrine is so empowered. Asbestos liability was a testing ground 
for judicial innovation as Flinn shows.19  
                                                                                                     
715 N.E.2d 1062, 1102 (Ohio 1999) (declaring civil justice reform amendments 
unconstitutional under the Ohio constitution); Lakin v. Senco Prods. Inc., 987 
P.2d 463, 475 (Or. 1999) (declaring a cap on noneconomic damages to be an 
unconstitutional violation of Oregon right to jury trial). But see McDougall v. 
Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Mich. 1999) (upholding statute setting strict 
requirements concerning qualifications of experts in medical malpractice cases 
in face of challenge brought under Michigan’s constitution). 
 17. See John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due 
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529 
(2005) (“This Article calls for recognition of a right, grounded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to a body of law that empowers individuals to 
seek redress against persons who have wronged them.”). 
 18. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 755 (arguing that state’s statutory responses 
to take-home asbestos litigation should be individualized).  
 19. See id. at 711–28 (discussing state courts’ various approaches to take-
home asbestos liability). 
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In Part III, I canvass the scope of liability question that Flinn 
examines thoroughly and effectively.20 She is concerned with 
elucidating the role of foreseeability in the duty of care question 
and compares the Third Restatement’s Section 721 articulation of 
the duty of care.22 The courts have used both lenses to ascertain 
whether a duty is owed to those exposed to asbestos in the 
household. The duty issue can become complex and its reasoning 
circular. The duty problem I submit is a familiar one, and it runs 
along recognized channels to extend a duty to family members. I 
agree that the test will depend upon knowledge of the toxicity of 
asbestos at the time of the exposure.23 This inevitably leads to 
discussions relating to extent of warnings required for later 
acquired knowledge and liability for monitoring for asbestos-
related diseases in this new class of plaintiffs. 
Part IV brings us back to the courts and legislatures as 
institutions dealing with the imbroglios of liability and 
compensation. My point is that given the fact that tort law has 
played its strong remedial function in uncovering the toxicity of 
asbestos and has done the spade work in ascribing responsibility, 
the task is now one of efficient claims administration. Courts are 
institutionally weak in devising the machinery for claims 
administration. They may attempt to set up, as in the DES 
cases,24 rules for settlement, but the extent of claims in size and 
numbers of claimants beggar the ability of courts. The American 
court system, without legislative assistance, has struggled 
mightily to cobble together a claims-making and compensation 
apparatus through class actions often involving bankruptcy.25 
                                                                                                     
 20. See id. at 723 (highlighting the problems with extending liability in 
take-home asbestos exposure cases).  
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010) 
(eliminating analysis of foreseeability from duty analysis). 
 22. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 728–30 (discussing the Third Restatement’s 
duty analysis). 
 23. See id. at 715 (explaining that in take-home asbestos cases, the 
existence of duty frequently depends the date on which the exposure occurred 
and whether the toxicity of asbestos was known at that time).  
 24. See infra note 62 (listing a few of the many cases on DES litigation). 
 25. See Francis E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class Actions-
Claims Administration, 35 J. CORP. L. 123, 129 (2009) (discussing settlement 
fund distributions in personal injury cases); LLOYD DIXON, GEOFFREY MCGOVERN 
& AMY COOMBE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS: 
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Courts, however, are ill suited to the task, especially in a federal 
system. In the best of worlds, the legislature acting for the benefit 
of claimants and defendants would devise a neutral means of 
claims resolution. This would mitigate the problems of 
opportunistic behavior by claimants, vis-à-vis one another and by 
defendants who are intent on exploiting the barriers to fair and 
rational resolution in large class actions cases.26 My basic point is 
that it is entirely appropriate to reward handsomely plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in the arduous and financially risky endeavor of 
uncovering tortious behavior. Here they act as private attorneys 
general.27 But it is wasteful to continue to incur the same overlay 
of expenses generated by rent-seeking lawyers crimping scarce 
judicial time and resources, when the function is the 
administration of mature claims that calls for facilitation of 
compensation and some extension of the class of persons that 
might be justly compensated.28 Here a positive sum game invites 
the legislature to set up an efficient resolution apparatus.  
II. Asbestos: Tort As Information Forcing 
The ancients were cognizant both of the benefits and hazards 
of asbestos. As Professor Fraley has explained, the knowledge 
                                                                                                     
AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON THE 
LARGEST TRUSTS xi (2010) (reviewing bankruptcy claims of companies with 
significant liability for asbestos-related injuries). 
 26. On this point, it is apparent that to devise a mixed system of a 
compensation scheme against a continuing stream of litigation will be highly 
wasteful. See David F. Partlett & Russell L. Weaver, BP Oil Spill: 
Compensation, Agency Costs, and Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 
1360 (2011) (describing the drawbacks of compensation schemes competing 
against ongoing litigation). 
 27. I cannot deny, however, that the rewards carry the risk of corruption of 
the judicial system. See, e.g., CURTIS WILKIE, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ZEUS: 
THE RISE AND RUIN OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL TRIAL ATTORNEY 5 (2010) 
(telling the story about Dick Scruggs, a lawyer who struck it rich in tobacco 
litigation and was later indicted for bribery). 
 28. But modern scholars remain concerned about the inherent 
inefficiencies in delivering compensation in large, complex suits. See Howard M. 
Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
265, 320 (2011) (“Of the roughly $7 billion Merck will have to spend on the Vioxx 
litigation, approximately $3.5 billion will have been on attorneys’ fees, including 
roughly $2 billion for defense litigation fees.”). 
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was lost although it had come to light before the Second World 
War.29 One may speculate that the fog of the Second World War, 
with the exigencies of building an arsenal for democracy, blinded 
industry from attending to occupational health and safety. The 
exposure during this period was significant and was to manifest 
itself in disease in these workers in the 1960s when they reported 
asbestosis and mesothelioma.30 Legal doctrine, with its roots in 
medieval times, was ill-equipped to cope with the perplexing 
causation problems and the scope of class of persons suffering 
from the diseases. Justice Cardozo had formulated his wide 
concept of the duty of care in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,31 
recognizing that in a modern industrial society, goods were 
manufactured and distributed on a massive scale.32 Thus, a broad 
duty was called for to fit the expectations of consumers and the 
needs of society for reasonably safe products.33 A duty was to be 
extended to all those foreseeably physically injured as result of a 
person’s negligent act.34 The law had moved beyond confined 
relationships, such as occupier–entrant or employer–employee, 
from liability for inherently dangerous activities and for 
adulterated food and drugs, and beyond the confines of 
contractual privity.35 Nevertheless, an accident stemming from a 
negligent act had a stopping point given the laws of friction. It 
occurred within a manageable time frame and its causes were 
observable. In MacPherson, the defective wheel in the Buick 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Jill M. Fraley, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, 
Commentary at the Washington and Lee Law Review Note Colloquium (Sept. 
19, 2013) (describing the historical evolution of knowledge on the dangers of 
asbestos). 
 30. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST. (May 1, 
2009), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2013) (describing the nature and the history and use of asbestos) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 32. See id. at 1050 (extending negligence law to machinery that, when used 
dangerously, can cause injury to others). 
 33. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of 
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1825, 1846–47 (1998) (explaining the 
breadth of MacPherson’s holding on duty with respect to products liability). 
 34. See id. at 1821 (describing the role of foreseeability in duty 
determination envisioned by Judge Cardozo in Macpherson). 
 35. See id. at 1752–67 (describing the change in duty analysis occurring at 
the time of MacPherson). 
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would injure an obvious class of persons upon its collapse.36 In 
the classic English case of Donoghue v. Stevenson,37 the snail in 
the bottle of ginger beer on that warm Scottish summer day 
would affect a limited class of persons in a predictable way.38 The 
range of neighbors to whom a duty is owed is controllable. 
Benjamin Cardozo, recall, confined the scope of liability via duty 
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.39 to that class in the 
vicinity of the negligent act.40 Liability dealing with human 
interaction had a relational core stemming from ancient torts 
cases: the squib passed in panic in Scott v. Shepherd,41 the eye 
put out when the stick is swung back to separate dogs in a fight,42 
or the farrier applying his skills to the care of a horse.43 
Note the manifold challenges of asbestos liability. Whose 
asbestos caused the disease? When did the disease first occur? 
When was the disease discovered or discoverable? What if one 
disease is manifested and another follows?44 What knowledge did 
                                                                                                     
 36. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051 (“Unless its wheels were sound and 
strong, injury was almost certain.”). 
 37. [1932] A.C. 562 (Eng.); see also David Partlett, Tort Law, Revolution 
and the Bible, in OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA (forthcoming 2013) (discussing 
Donoghue v. Stevenson and comparing it to modern tort law and Biblical 
stories). 
 38. See Donoghue, [1932] A.C. at 562–63 (describing the facts of the case). 
 39. 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
 40. See id. at 100 (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to 
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the 
range of apprehension.”). 
 41. (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B.); see also M.J. Prichard, Scott v. 
Shepherd (1773) and the Emergence of the Tort of Negligence, Selden Society 
Lecture delivered in the Old Hall of Lincoln’s Inn (July 4, 1973) (discussing the 
Scott v. Shepherd case, in which the passing of a squib led to Scott losing his 
eye) (transcript available in the University of Technology, Sydney, Library). 
 42. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 298 (1850) (determining a case in 
which the defendant swung a stick to separate fighting dogs and accidentally hit 
the plaintiff). 
 43. See DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 17–18 (1985) 
(describing negligence hypotheticals). 
 44. The once-and-for-all rule requires that the damage be actionable, and 
once an action is brought, further actions are precluded. Cf. Joyce v. A.C. & S., 
Inc., 785 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Once a cause of action is complete 
and the statute of limitations begins to run, it runs against all damages 
resulting from the wrongful act, even damages which may not arise until a 
future date . . . .”); Gideon v. Johns Manville, 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 
1985) (“[A] plaintiff may not split this cause of action by seeking damages for 
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the manufactures have of the deleterious effects of asbestos? 
What other life style behaviors could have contributed to 
claimant’s illness? These do not include the problems of dealing 
with a large class and with severe magnitudes of damage. 
Moreover, as Flinn now highlights, we are faced with new waves 
of claimants stemming from the transportation of the fibers to 
third parties.45 Mesothelioma, unlike asbestosis, is not a product 
of constant of exposure over a long period; the cancer can arise 
from a minimal exposure.46  
Tort doctrine often modifies its rules to further the policies of 
tort law. For example, where plaintiffs face insuperable obstacles 
in proving the identity of the wrongdoer, courts will shift, in some 
cases, the burden of proof to the defendants to disprove their 
involvement and negligence in causing the accident.47 Thus, in 
the well-known case of Ybarra v. Spangard,48 the court found 
that the plaintiff’s injury arising in surgery could be inferred to 
have been caused by one of the members of the surgical team.49 
However, on traditional lines, the plaintiff would have failed, 
faced with the burden of showing, on the balance of probabilities, 
who had caused the paralysis. In some medical practice cases, the 
courts have been willing to allow recovery even though the 
plaintiff could not establish cause-in-fact. The classic case is 
                                                                                                     
some of his injuries in one suit and for later-developing injuries in another.”). In 
asbestos cases, a majority of courts have permitted a second action for cancer 
where the first disease was nonmalignant, like asbestosis. See, e.g., Marinari v. 
Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 612 A.2d 1021, 1028 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (allowing the 
action for cancer because the disease was not discovered until 1987); Sopha v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 601 N.W.2d 627, 638 (Wis. 1999) (allowing a 
second suit for newly discovered cancer but emphasizing that the case “presents 
a special circumstance”). 
 45. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 709–10 (explaining the new wave of asbestos 
litigation). 
 46. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 30 (explaining the 
causes and development of asbestosis and mesothelioma). 
 47. See Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 775 n.20 (1970) (discussing 
the possibility of distributing the loss over a class of defendants, specifically, 
those who benefited from the “cost savings accompanying the nonemployment of 
a lifeguard”). 
 48. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).  
 49. See id. at 691 (“[W]here a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while 
unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants who 
had any control over his body . . . may properly be called upon to meet the 
inference of negligence . . . .”). 
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where the patient is wrongly diagnosed but, if rightly diagnosed, 
would have died anyway.50 To fulfill the deterrence and other 
policy imperatives of tort law, some courts have been willing to 
give damages based on the lost chance of recovery, although it 
was less probable than not.51  
In a line of cases, the English courts have grappled with 
causation issues, attempting to overcome logical and proof 
problems in establishing causation. In the early case of McGhee v. 
National Coal Board,52 the pursuer, as plaintiffs are called in 
Scottish cases, contracted a skin disease from exposure to dust 
from the brickworks in which he worked.53 The defender was in 
breach of a duty to provide showers so he could wash before 
striking out for home, but the pursuer could not establish on the 
balance of probabilities that going home in an unwashed state 
had caused the skin disease.54 The court determined, however, 
that failure to shower had materially contributed to it and that 
was enough for the court to find causation.55 It was the very risk 
that the installation of the showers was designed to forestall.56  
The same causal dilemmas apply to asbestos when a person 
is exposed to asbestos from several culpable sources. In the 
English case of Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 479 
(Wash. 1983) (“We hold that medical testimony of a reduction of chance of 
survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient evidence to allow the 
proximate cause issue to go to the jury.”). 
 51. Note that wrongful life and wrongful birth cases illustrate strong 
examples of modifying the assumptions of tort liability to the ends of promoting 
deterrence and compensation. 
 52. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1. 
 53. See id. at 1 (describing the facts of the case). 
 54. See id. at 7–8 (stating that the pursuer “has succeeded in showing that 
his injury was, more probably than not, caused by . . . the defenders’ failure to 
provide a shower-bath”). 
 55. See id. at 2 (stating that the defendants’ failure to provide a shower 
materially contributed to the skin disease). 
 56.  See id. at 1 (explaining that the showers were meant to prevent the 
skin disease); Reynolds v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694, 698 (1885) 
[W]here the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the 
chances of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally 
leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have 
happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain 
of cause and effect between the negligence and the injury. 
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Limited,57 the plaintiff had contracted mesothelioma and 
established that asbestos had caused his disease.58 But he could 
not show along traditional lines that one employer rather than 
any other was responsible.59 Accordingly, he would have to fail. 
Lord Hoffman confirmed that liability should be established 
where 
between the employer in breach of duty and the employee who 
has lost his life in consequence of a period of exposure to risk 
to which the employer has contributed . . . it would be both 
inconsistent with the policy of the law and morally 
wrong . . . to impose causal requirements which exclude 
liability.60  
If some of the exposure were from a nontortious source, the 
House of Lords, in a later case, found that the liability could be 
apportioned according to each actor’s contribution to the risk of 
contracting mesothelioma.61 This was a large step, as were the 
American DES cases, in changing the rules of causation.62 The 
flexibility of the rules is designed to avoid the obstacles presented 
in tort doctrine that thwart the objectives of the law. In 
particular, knowledge gaps are cured. These doctrinal artifices 
are necessary to bolster the remedial purposes of the law.63  
It is notorious that the connection between asbestos and 
disease was not broadly brought to the attention of the public 
until the 1960s.64 The revelation of that information, as with 
                                                                                                     
 57. [2002] UKHL 22. 
 58. Id. at [3]–[5]. 
 59. See id. at [20] (discussing the difficulty in determining which of 
cumulatively operating factors caused the injury). 
 60. Id. at [63]. 
 61. See Barker v. Corus, [2006] UKHL 20, [48] (apportioning liability 
among the defendants). 
 62. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1071–72 (N.Y. 1989) 
(reviewing the applicability of the market share theory in a suit against DES 
manufacturers); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 926 (Cal. 1989) 
(considering claims that defendants are jointly liable “regardless of which 
particular brand of DES was ingested by plaintiff’s mother”). 
 63. See Dan Farber, Recurring Misses, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 727, 737 (1990) 
(explaining that scholarship can “separate” rules of law, resulting in “a barrier 
of intellectual inertia”). 
 64. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 30 (explaining 
when the danger of asbestos became understood). 
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similar revelations about tobacco, owed much to tort law, inviting 
the attention of plaintiffs’ lawyers and the rewards of class 
actions. The law of torts has multiple purposes. An instrumental 
aim, if second order purpose, is to reveal information about harm 
producing products.65 Liability rules can then impose costs on 
their production. The externalities that resulted in social costs 
can then be accounted for or internalized. As with punitive 
damages, information is often hidden, and the incentives to bring 
it to light and hold wrongdoers accountable are weak. Thus, we 
find that the supercompensatory damages awarded incentivize 
attorneys to act in the public good; they are sometimes described 
as private attorneys general.66 Without such incentives, wrongs 
would not be unearthed and the purposes of the law to do justice 
between citizens and inculcate community welfare would be 
stillborn.67 To be sure, other organs of government may function 
to reveal harm producing information, but in the United States in 
particular, feckless legislatures rarely function efficiently to do 
so. Private enforcement in the public interest is a preferred route. 
The social benefit of illuminating the recesses of wrongfully 
caused diseases cannot be denied. The expense of the tort system 
too cannot be denied. Yet, unless another social institution at less 
cost could reveal the information, the expense is justified. 
Moreover, it is a well-established and time-honored role of tort 
law to bring a measure of justice to the victims of harm-producing 
products. The information-forcing function of tort law in some 
cases reveals its inherent limits. The litigation process, powerful 
in forcing out information, is a poor vehicle for delivering 
compensation. Flinn points out that many firms have declared 
bankruptcy.68 This has not been because of the enormity of the 
                                                                                                     
 65. Note that claimants in medical malpractice actions state that a prime 
aim in litigation is to determine information about the malpractice event. See 
FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 64–71 (1913) 
(describing litigation goals in medical malpractice). 
 66. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 
2003) (describing the award of punitive damages as “private” prosecution); Ill. 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977) (explaining that the possibility of 
bringing a treble-damages action is a “weapon of antitrust enforcement”). 
 67. See generally Andrew Robertson, Rights, Pluralism and the Duty of 
Care, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 435 (Nolan & Robertson eds., 2012).  
 68. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 710 (stating that asbestos liability has been 
a factor in almost 100 companies’ declaration of bankruptcy).  
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damages so much as the absence of effective ways of running 
class actions with their polyglot claimants and defendants avid 
for peace. The bankruptcy process provides a framework in which 
to accommodate the claims, work out priorities, and balance the 
interests of different classes of claimants and defendants.69 No 
doubt the procedures are clumsy and inefficient. They force 
courts to act as administrative bodies that corrode judicial 
independence and impartial distance.70 The transaction costs 
generated mean that the dollars delivered to claimants come at 
high cost. 
In the mid twentieth century, many tort scholars despaired 
of tort law as a compensation system.71 The despair prompted 
them to recommend that tort law be abolished and compensation 
schemes be substituted. The apogee of this development was the 
adoption in New Zealand of their compensation scheme.72 The 
schemes would deliver, it was claimed, compensation at less cost. 
The model, however, was static and did not account for the tort 
system’s power in information forcing. It assumed a frozen state 
in which the claims cognizable are the run-of-mill running down 
and simple accidents causing personal injuries. New Zealand did 
                                                                                                     
 69. The Dow Corning breast implant litigation illustrates this point. See 
Chronology of Breast Implants, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/implants/cron.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 70. See John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just 
Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2063 (1997) (“Judge 
Weinstein is of the view that victims [of mass torts] ‘deserve help from the 
government not aid through a suit against private corporations.’” (citing In re 
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.1987) (internal brackets omitted))). See generally PETER H. 
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986). 
 71. See David Partlett, Of Law Reform Lions and the Limits of Tort Reform, 
27 SYD. L. REV. 417, 439 (2005) (discussing how mass tort litigation has “forced” 
courts to administrate compensation systems). 
 72. See Partlett, supra note 26, at 1359 (describing the New Zealand 
compensation scheme that replaced tort liability in the 1960s); GEOFFREY 
PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 69–104 (1979) (describing the debate over the 
Accident Compensation Bill, which set up a government compensation 
framework to reimburse victims of personal injury). For a later discussion on 
the evolution and limits of the scheme, see generally Peter H. Schuck, Tort 
Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187 (2008), and Stephen Todd, 
Treatment Injury in New Zealand, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1169 (2011). 
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not cover diseases, although this was not seen as a failing at the 
time,73 and when Australia was considering a compensation 
scheme, it was seriously contemplated. The dynamic aspect of 
tort liability, sometimes its ugly face, is the one that delivers a 
public good. But for garden-variety tracks of accidents and when 
the parameters of liability are well worn, the tort system does not 
have the same salience.  
It follows that tort law in the asbestos imbroglio can claim 
real success in revelation of information but must admit to a deep 
impediment in delivering compensation.74 And just when we 
thought that we were emerging from the claims agony, along 
comes a new class of claimant. Like Macbeth, we see multiple 
generations before us and like him, we are aghast. Flinn is right 
to want to move beyond courts acting ab initio in adjudicating 
claims.75 A system of compensation should draw on knowledge 
painfully gained over the decades of asbestos litigation. 
Unfortunately, the legislatures seem little interested in finding 
efficient compensation schemes that would benefit victims and 
defendants alike.  
III. The Courts and the Scope of Liability 
An admirable and noteworthy aspect of Flinn’s Note is her 
analysis of the scope of liability issue regarding the take-home 
asbestos claims.76 The discussion confirms the confused state of 
the issue here, and it is consistent with the fraught state of the 
law as claims on the periphery of tort law are examined. Once the 
courts declared that the categories of negligence were not 
                                                                                                     
 73. The point is well taken if social welfare in a narrow sense is the 
command. See generally THE WELFARE STATE TODAY: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY IN 
NEW ZEALAND IN THE SEVENTIES (Geoffrey Palmer ed., 1977). 
 74. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 21–68 (2005) (highlighting the inefficiencies of litigation). 
In the 1980s, the costs of compensation were estimated to be thirty-seven cents 
in every dollar of compensation. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR 
CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION 60 (2002).  
 75. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 751 (stressing that the long-term solution to 
take-home asbestos litigation lies in state legislatures). 
 76. See id. at 723 (highlighting the problems with extending liability in 
take-home asbestos exposure cases).  
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“closed,”77 the courts throughout the common law world have 
searched for limiting principles.  
We like to ridicule Baron Alderson’s warning in Winterbottom 
v. Wright,78 when he endorsed the privity restriction in the duty 
of care warning that if “one step why not fifty?”79 Such 
pusillanimity was swept aside by bolder spirits and especially in 
the twentieth century by the powerful rhetoric of the two great 
common law jurists, Lord Atkin and Benjamin Cardozo. 
Pandora’s Box was prized open—no longer was liability confined 
to recognized, carefully defined, relationships. A broad principle 
of hydraulic force was unleashed. Using the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan, Lord Atkin said that the duty of care extends to one’s 
neighbor.80 And who is my neighbor? It is that person who will be 
foreseeably harmed by my act.81 Cardozo in MacPherson was 
more pragmatic but just as broad.82 Modern manufacture and 
distribution of goods demanded a responsibility to those persons 
injured by negligently made products. The scope of that duty was 
articulated in foreseeability terms in Palsgraf twelve years 
later.83 
The courts have hopelessly muddled the distinction between 
duty and proximate cause or scope of duty. Of course, the mess 
begins in Palsgraf itself where we have Cardozo opting for a duty 
analysis84 and Andrews going for a proximate cause framework.85 
                                                                                                     
 77. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 619 (H.L.) (“The categories of 
negligence are never closed.”). 
 78. (1842) 10 Meeson & Welsby 109 (H.L.). 
 79. Id. at 115 (“The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those 
who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason 
why we should not go fifty.”). 
 80. See Donoghue, [1932] A.C. 562 at 580 (“The rule that you are to love 
your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour . . . .”).  
 81. See id. (“The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and 
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or 
omissions which are called in question.”). 
 82. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916) 
(explaining that the presence of a known danger creates a duty). 
 83. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (“The risk 
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports 
relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”). 
 84. See id. at 99–101 (applying duty analysis). 
 85. See id. at 101–02 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (applying proximate cause). 
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Duty played its part, Cardozo said, because before causation 
becomes relevant we have to ask if Mrs. Palgraf was within that 
class of persons to whom a duty was owed.86 This could only be 
the case if a sufficient relation existed between her and the Long 
Island Railroad. That depended in turn on whether the eye of 
“ordinary vigilance” would perceive the hazard.87 Duty cannot 
exist in the air; it is a term of relation. Andrews, however, started 
with the opposite idea. A duty is owed simply to the world at 
large.88 The limits to liability are found in proximate cause and 
that is a question of fact depending upon “practical politics.”89 
Cardozo won the skirmish in Palsgraf but was to lose the war to 
Andrews. The recently promulgated Section 7 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts is confirmation of this. A duty is owed to exercise 
reasonable care to all those to whom the conduct creates a risk of 
physical harm.90 The vast majority of run-of-the-mill cases with 
which negligence law is concerned are covered by the formula. 
Duty is never argued in a running-down-highway case. But in 
new areas of expansion, duty does play a vital part as recognized 
in subsection (b) of Section 7, which allows for limitations of or 
denial of duty for a countervailing principle or policy.91 In 
particular, when the risk created is not physical in threatening 
person or property or when the defendant has not acted but 
rather has omitted to act, the question is one of the boundaries of 
tort liability.92  
This is why some courts, as explained by Flinn, have adopted 
reasoning that the asbestos defendants have not acted but merely 
                                                                                                     
 86. See id. at 101 (majority opinion) (“The law of causation, remote or 
proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us.”). 
 87. Id. at 100. 
 88. See id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (describing negligence as “an 
act or omission which unreasonably does or may affect the rights of others”). 
 89. Id. at 103. 
 90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010) 
(“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s 
conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”). 
 91. See id. (allowing for a finding of no duty in the face of countervailing 
policies or principles). 
 92. One is reminded of Prosser’s analysis of the “borderland of tort and 
contract.” See W. Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED 
TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380 (1953) (discussing the overlap between tort and 
contract). 
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omitted to act in relation to asbestos brought home from work.93 
As she intimates, this is a difficult line to draw. An omission is 
actionable if a person has a positive duty to act in another’s 
protection. Thus, the employer perceiving the danger of asbestos 
may have a duty to protect family members who would be subject 
to constant and deleterious contact with asbestos fibers.  
Flinn suggests we accept Professor Zipursky’s criticism of 
Section 794 and keep the concept of foreseeability in the duty 
formula.95 Zipursky’s argument is that foreseeability has been 
long accepted by the courts and that the Restatement’s “purge”96 
of foreseeability does not describe actual court decisions.97 As 
Torts professors know, the term is well ensconced, and students 
and lawyers are much misled by it, perhaps as Comment j to 
Section 7 suggests, to blind courts to more transparent 
explanations of “no duty” findings.98 The use of the term may also 
confuse the jury’s and judge’s roles in negligence questions.99 
Many, however, remain faithful to it as Flinn points out.100 Let us 
declare that it has no independent function except as a shell in 
which to bring to bear the factors that the courts regard as 
material in founding a duty in a particular case. The Supreme 
Court of California “can on a clear day foresee forever.”101 Other 
courts in the common law world have the same clairvoyance. 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 725 (describing cases in which the court 
defined the defendant’s conduct as “nonfeasance”).  
 94. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, 
and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1257 (2009). 
 95. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 747 (suggesting that foreseeability should 
remain in duty analysis).  
 96. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 
742 (2005). 
 97. See Zipursky, supra note 94, at 1257 (explaining that the rejection of 
foreseeability in duty analysis contradicts the common practice of most courts). 
 98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 cmt. j (2010) 
(stating that a court must justify a “no-duty” ruling “without obscuring 
references to foreseeability”). 
 99. See Cardi, supra note 96, at 799 (reasoning that foreseeability decisions 
belong to the jury rather than the judge). 
 100. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 747 (“[M]aintaining foreseeability of harm as 
a factor in duty analysis conforms to the practice of most states . . . .”).  
 101. Sturgeon v. Curnutt, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 501 (1994) (“On a clear day, 
you can foresee forever.” (citing Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (1989) 
(attributing the thought to Bernard E. Witkin, Esq.))). 
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Certainly, in asbestos claims, knowledge of the harm of asbestos 
exposure is important, if not critical.102 Foreseeability is not 
knowledge. Foreseeability is a comfortable word for courts to use 
to decide if a duty should adhere. Can it be doubted that once 
employers know of the risks posed by asbestos, it is foreseeable 
that family members will be within that class of persons who will 
be harmed in an entirely predictable way? Two ways present 
themselves in dealing with the issue. First it may be said that 
policy reasons ought to deny that duty of care extends to family. 
Or one could find that the damage was not proximate or was 
outside the scope of the duty. Flinn, for reasons of judicial 
economy, would want the take-home asbestos actions to be 
subject to summary judgment.103 The latter approach, being one 
focusing on fact, is therefore the less attractive. Judge Andrews 
in Palsgraf found the jury as the institution that should decide 
scope in its good sense.104 Flinn would not want matters to be left 
in the maw of the jury for well-articulated reasons.105 Of course, 
some courts have boldly made an end run around the fact enquiry 
by declaring, as a matter of law, that the damage is too remote.106 
Alternatively, courts often utilize the duty concept to find no 
liability in categories of cases for policy reasons. Note the 
reasoning in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.107 A 
duty was found in Tarasoff where the victim was clearly 
                                                                                                     
 102. But see Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 
(N.J. 1982) (imposing liability without requiring proof of the defendant’s 
knowledge of the toxic qualities of asbestos). This was quickly repudiated. See, 
e.g., Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1158 (N.J. 2008) (“Foreseeability in 
the context of a duty analysis must assess the knowledge of the risk of injury to 
be apprehended.” (citation omitted)). 
 103. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 747 (explaining the need for courts to use 
foreseeability in duty analysis so they can “quickly eliminate factually deficient 
cases at summary judgment”).  
 104. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 105 (1928) (Andrews, 
J., dissenting) (stating that the negligence question in the case should have been 
submitted to the jury). 
 105. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 751 (discussing the court’s role in take-home 
asbestos cases).  
 106. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1964) 
(“Somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that the link has 
become too tenuous—that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity.”). 
 107. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
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identified.108 But a duty would not be found, later cases 
emphasized, to extend to a class of persons who are merely 
foreseeable.109 
Flinn’s Note agrees with Kotlarsky that if Section 7 were 
applied, fewer “no duty” determinations would be found.110 I, in 
fact, see it the opposite way. The policy grounds are at the center 
of the judge’s role. To rid the analysis of “foreseeability” may lead 
to clarity in purging factual determinations from the duty issue, 
thus excluding the jury. Courts may then, in duty 
determinations, create precedent on policy and principles grounds 
that allow summary judgments more readily. It may be noted 
that the English courts have experimented in bringing policy 
factors to the fore in duty determinations. The test in Anns v. 
Merton London Borough Council111 talks in terms of a prima facie 
duty arising where “a sufficient relationship of proximity or 
neighborhood” is established and where in “reasonable 
contemplation . . . carelessness . . . may . . . cause damage.”112 
Then, it is a matter whether there are considerations “which 
ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty.”113 
The intent, as in Section 7, was to bring to the surface the real 
reasoning animating the court in determining the scope of the 
duty. The fate of this test has not been a happy one. Courts have 
found it too mechanical, and the overt promotion of policy has not 
suited later English and Commonwealth courts, which are more 
accustomed to incremental advances in the domain of the law of 
negligence.114 This experience seems to support Flinn’s criticism 
                                                                                                     
 108. See id. at 341 (stating that the defendant had told his therapist that he 
was going to kill Tatiana Tarasoff).  
 109. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 737–38 (explaining Zipursky’s analysis of 
Tarasoff). The extent of liability and its definition is well observed in a number 
of cases relating to the liability of landlords for injuries due to criminal actions 
of third parties on leased premises. See, e.g., Tan v. Arnel Mgmt. Co., 88 Cal 
Rptr. 3d 754, 765 (2009) (concluding that the risk of violent criminal assaults on 
the property was foreseeable such that the defendant landlord had a duty to 
provide minimal security measures to protect tenants). For collected cases and 
commentary, see VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S 
TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 532–33 (12th ed. 2010). 
 110. Flinn, supra note 2, at 740. 
 111. [1978] AC 728. 
 112. Id. at 751–52. 
 113. Id. 
 114. In Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman, Judge Brennan in the High 
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of Section 7. I have no doubt that we have just begun the sturm 
und drang on the duty formulation in Section 7. Little would 
matter if the courts would keep the meaning of foreseeability 
clear in their mind. It does not mean knowledge of risk. It is an 
amalgamation of factors that, to be sure, incorporates knowledge 
along with concerns about the costs of precaution and gravity of 
the harm that might ensue. Duty determines the scope of 
responsibility for a wrongful actor. It is a wide concept when the 
risk pertains to physical harm but is more narrowly confined 
when the interests stray from the physical, for example, to pure 
economic risks and emotional distress. It will require the finding 
of a special relationship where the duty is to take precautions to 
protect another.115  
Flinn gets the test entirely correct in her “Multi-Factored 
Test.”116 I do not see, however, that Section 7 detracts from such a 
test. In citing Chaisson v. Avondale Industries, Inc.,117 a case from 
Louisiana, we see immediately how some courts misunderstand 
‘foreseeability.”118 Knowledge of the risk will be a central factor 
that nothing in the Third Restatement revokes. It goes to the 
relationship that the Supreme Court of Michigan places at the 
forefront.119 It will remain a critical matter, as a Pennsylvania 
                                                                                                     
Court of Australia said:  
It is preferable in my view, that the law should develop novel 
categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with 
established categories, rather than by a massive extension of a prima 
facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable “considerations 
which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or 
the class of person to whom it is owed. 
[1985] 69 A.L.R. 1, 43–44.  
 115. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (1976) 
(stating that the relationship between a therapist and his patient “create[s] a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another’s 
conduct”).  
 116. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 746 (proposing a multi-factored test for 
courts to apply to take-home asbestos cases).  
 117. 947 So. 2d 171 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 118. See id. at 183 (explaining that because the asbestos injuries occurred 
after OSHA revealed the risks of household exposure to asbestos, the defendant 
had knowledge of the risks).  
 119. See In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740 
N.W.2d 206, 216 (Mich. 2007) (holding that because the plaintiff did not have a 
legally significant relationship with the defendant, no duty should be imposed). 
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court opines, that the consequences of take-home asbestos were 
little known at the time of exposure.120 In policy terms, how could 
the manufacturers have taken reasonable precautions against 
such a remote risk? All this as Flinn states, is an application of 
the common law.121 The Third Restatement neither adds nor 
subtracts to the clarity of the test, if we are able to understand 
the true nature of the duty concept.  
Flinn’s Note does great service in exploring the options. As I 
read her analysis, I was reminded of T.S. Eliot’s incisive 
observations about our human experience:  
We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our 
exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the 
place for the first time.122 
Along these lines, I offer the sage words of Justice Michael Kirby 
of the Australian High Court in Graham Barclay Oysters v. 
Ryan.123 In that case, the question was whether the local and 
state authorities responsible for the upkeep of lakes in which 
oysters were grown were liable when contaminated oysters 
caused the plaintiffs harm.124 Justice Kirby discussed the “search 
for methodology for determining a duty.”125 He goes back to 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in his famous lectures on his book, The 
Common Law, where he found that the “general foundation of 
legal liability in blameworthiness, as determined by the existing 
average standards of the community, should always be kept in 
mind.”126 After an examination of English and Australian 
authorities over seventy years on the duty issue he opined as 
follows:  
                                                                                                     
 120. See Hudson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 1991-C-2078, 1995 WL 
17778064, at *4 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 12, 1995) (“[N]othing in the record 
demonstrated that the defendant was on notice, prior to 1960, that an 
employee’s wife was at risk of contracting mesothelioma.”). 
 121. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 745 (stating that the duty determination is 
an application of a state’s common law, which varies from state to state).  
 122. T.S. ELIOT, FOUR QUARTETS 59 (2009). 
 123. (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
 124. See id. at [3] (discussing the plaintiff’s claim against the oyster 
distributers and growers). 
 125. Id. at [230]. 
 126. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 125 (1882). 
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The search for such a simple formula [for determining the 
existence of a duty of care] may indeed be a “will-o’-the wisp.” 
It may send those who pursue it around in never-ending 
circles that ultimately bring the traveller back to the very 
point at which the journey began. Thus we seem to have 
returned to the fundamental test for imposing a duty of care, 
which arguably explains all the attempts made so far. That is, 
a duty of care will be imposed when it is reasonable in all the 
circumstances to do so. That is the test that Gummow J and I 
adopted in our joint reasons in the recent decision in Tame v. 
New South Wales . . . . Even if the approach of the other 
members of the Court in that case does not do so explicitly, it 
is obvious that the “touchstone” of reasonableness is 
fundamental to the way in which they determined the 
existence or otherwise of a duty of care.127 
These are words that ought to encourage Flinn. Her analysis is 
precisely a return to the common law of the duty of care as 
measured by proportionality and reasonableness. The duty will 
depend upon the factors she finds. Each court will have its own 
assessment of the duty here in question. Over time it may be that 
the duty question as a matter of law will be restricted to allow 
defendants quiet in the face of these claims.  
Before leaving this part of the Comment, I need to comment 
on a line of cases that Flinn herself finds unconvincing and that 
is a prime demonstration of how the duty analysis can be 
obfuscated. This has to do with the line of cases that finds no 
duty because the take-home asbestos cases are mere omissions 
and not actions, nonfeasance and not misfeasance.128 These “no 
duty” cases are best understood in terms of the common law 
stance that there is no duty to rescue. The Priest and the Levite 
passed the broken man on the road. They acted shamefully but 
did not breach a duty of care even though they know their 
nonchalance would cause him harm—they had not caused the 
plight and continuing suffering of the person in peril.129 More 
generally, there is no duty to protect another from the actions of a 
third party. To find a duty to take affirmative actions to protect 
                                                                                                     
 127. Ryan (2002) 211 CLR at [244] (citations omitted). 
 128. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 724 (listing cases based on the distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance). 
 129. See L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. 1942) 
(describing the biblical story of the priest and the Levite). 
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another, one needs to establish a relationship that obliges action. 
Thus, in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,130 an opinion by 
Cardozo, who had championed the broad duty of care in 
MacPherson, the plaintiffs who suffered loss by fire when the 
defendant had supplied water at a pressure below that contracted 
for with the city could not recover.131 The defendant had simply 
failed to bestow a benefit.132 That contractual failure alone could 
not establish a relationship.133  
In the take-home cases, there is clearly an act: a failure to 
warn against the risks in distribution of asbestos. The plaintiffs 
could be said to be in a class of persons that would be imperiled 
by exposure. The husbands were the mere transporters of the 
fibers, and if the defendants knew about the consequences of 
exposure, they could have taken steps to avoid the danger. To 
take the defective wheel in MacPherson134 and the scope of 
liability, it could not be contended that if the breaking of the 
wheel injured pedestrians they would be outside the zone of legal 
protection.135 Some of the cases referred to by Flinn frame the 
duty in terms of a duty to warn.136 Now this is understandable 
since to impose strict liability for products that have no design or 
manufacturing defects, the route to liability is through the failure 
to warn.137 This invites a nonfeasance analysis, but it is a trap. 
                                                                                                     
 130. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). 
 131. See id. at 899 (finding in favor of the defendants). 
 132. See id. (“What we are dealing with at this time is a mere negligent 
omission, unaccompanied by malice or other aggravating elements.”). 
 133. See Sutradhar v. Nat’l Env’t Research Council, [2006] UKHL 33, [2006] 
4 All E.R. 490 (Eng.); Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 (Austl.). 
 134. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916) 
(explaining the case’s facts). 
 135. Consider the foundational strict liability case, Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). The defective product was a “shopsmith” 
that injured the plaintiff when it ejected a piece of wood unexpectedly. Id. at 
898. The plaintiff had received the product from his wife for Christmas two 
years before. Id. No finding of negligence was necessary. The defendant was 
strictly liable. Id. at 900. The product had a defect. Id. at 901. If the wood had 
hit another, liability would have been extended to that person or to any others. 
See id. at 900 (“A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places 
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 374 
(Tenn. 2008) (stating that the employer, who knew the dangers of take-home 
asbestos, could have prevented or reduced the harm to the plaintiff). 
 137. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991) 
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The class of persons in the scope of liability does not depend on 
showing a special relationship as it does in negligence, where the 
issue is protection against actions of third parties or natural 
events.138 Rather, those within the scope of liability are all those 
who will foreseeably be affected by exposure. If the product poses 
dangers to a class of persons, the defendant will be liable without 
a showing of negligence if the defendant knew or should have 
known of the danger.139 Just as pedestrians are injured by the 
breach in building an automobile with a negligently defective 
wheel, the injured plaintiffs in the take-home asbestos cases are 
injured by exposure to the fibers. The question may be whether 
adding new layers of duty would be too burdensome, but it is the 
act of the defendants in producing or using asbestos that has 
resulted in the harm.   
Lastly, let me suggest that the scope of liability ought to 
extend to take-home asbestos victims. I recognize that liability 
must be cut off somewhere, and principle and policy will dictate 
where the line is to be drawn whether under the rubric of 
foreseeability or the test embodied in Section 7. Flinn’s 
multifactorial test is precisely on point. The one critical factor in 
my view is that the class of persons to whom the duty is owed is 
limited.140 The injuries arose from the injuries to the mothers and 
                                                                                                     
(discussing strict liability in the context of “failure to warn”). 
 138. A duty to take affirmative steps to protect another from the acts of 
others requires a showing of “control” with knowledge of particular risks that 
eventuated. L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. 1942). The costs 
of imposing a duty of affirmative action are critical. See Hegel v. Langsam, 273 
N.E. 351, 352 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1971) (refusing to place a duty on a university to 
“regulate the private lives of students,” a duty that would be difficult to meet). 
 139. See Anderson, 810 P.2d at 559 (stating that a defendant in a strict 
products liability action is liable unless the particular risk was “neither known 
nor knowable” at the time the product was manufactured). 
 140. Recall that in Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., the New York Court of Appeals 
felt compelled to draw a line as to disentitle third generation claimants from 
compensation in tort. See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co, 570 N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 
1991) (“It is our duty to confine liability within manageable limits.”). In Chief 
Justice Wachler’s opinion, the class of plaintiffs, the third generation, was 
neither “exposed to the defendants’ dangerous product [n]or negligent conduct.” 
Id. at 204. This line also supports the conservative ruling in Albala v. City of 
New York, in which the court rejected that a duty would be owed to a child born 
with “injuries suffered as a result of a preconception tort against the mother.” 
Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. 1981); see also State of 
La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1171 (E.D. La. 1981), aff’d, 
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close family members’ exposure to the very substance that 
caused injuries in the primary victims. As a physical substance, 
the consequences will cease through the natural law of physics. 
This may be put in terms of the zone of impact. Assuming 
knowledge of the consequences of asbestos exposure, close 
family would be “foreseeable” victims.  
Moreover, family members of tort victims have often 
warranted favorable treatment in terms of liability, even where 
the injuries are of a different kind and where deterrence has 
been garnered by findings of liability vis-à-vis primary 
victims.141 The bystander cases in emotional distress are a prime 
example. It is true that familial relationships no longer 
immunize actors from tort liability to the extent they did in the 
past. But the fact of relationship is still central to the 
determination of the scope of liability as seen in a long line of 
authority drawing the boundaries to emotional distress in the 
bystander cases. Close family of primary victims form members 
of the foreseeable class of persons.142 They are persons who are 
particularly vulnerable to the use of a term of relation. Professor 
Stapleton has emphasized this,143 and the High Court of 
                                                                                                     
728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing liability to an open-ended class in the 
context of economic loss); Perre v Apand Pty. Ltd. (1999) 198 CLR 180 (Austl.) 
(same); cf. Renslow v. Menonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (finding 
that the defendant owed a duty in the case of a preconception tort). 
 141. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 839 (Cal. 1989) (reviewing a 
case in which the plaintiff–mother claimed emotional injury because of the 
stress caused when hearing about a car accident involving her son). The earlier 
case of Dillon v. Legg adopted the familial relationship as an element of 
proximity to precipitate a duty of care to a bystander. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 
P.2d 912, 924 (Cal. 1968) (providing recovery to a plaintiff–mother bystander). 
In some cases the relationship may bring the claimant into a duty relationship 
as a “direct victim.” E.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 816 
(Cal. 1980). 
 142. Cf. Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 (Austl.); Annetts v 
Australian Stations Pty Ltd. (2002) 191 ALR 449, 508 (Austl.) (comparing the 
husband-wife relationship in Tame to the parent–child relationship in Annetts). 
 143. See generally Jane Stapleton, The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort 
Law: Protection of the Vulnerable, 24 AUSTL. BAR REV. 135 (2003); Jane 
Stapleton, Duty of Care Factors: a Selection from the Judicial Menus, in THE 
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN FLEMING 59, 70–80, 83–87 
(1998); Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative 
Opportunities for Deterrence, 111 LQR 301, 303, 305, 331, 342, 345 (1995); Jane 
Stapleton, In Restraint of Tort, in THE FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 83, 92–93 (1994); 
Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: a Wider Agenda, 107 LQR 249, 
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Australia has adopted it.144 The protection given to children is a 
prime example of the treatment of the vulnerable by the law of 
negligence.145 Given knowledge on the part of asbestos producers 
of the consequences of asbestos exposure, to find family members 
are owed a duty fulfills the deterrence aims of the law and 
compensates victims who can, without a doubt, establish 
causation.146  
In any event, if the courts are the institutions to continue to 
seek to draw liability lines in these new asbestos cases, Flinn’s 
points will be taken as important departure points for judicial 
endeavors in finding suitable boundaries for the scope of liability. 
My contribution is to begin to suggest some other lines of analysis 
that may bring these take-home cases into the category of 
compensable exposure events. My next Part is again inspired by 
Flinn’s suggestion that state legislatures need to pick up the 
mantle of reform. 
IV. Asbestos, the Courts, and Legislatures 
Flinn describes the failures of Congress in promoting a 
claims and compensation scheme that would tackle the obstacles 
in the way of administering asbestos claims.147 Legislatures may 
                                                                                                     
266ff (1991).  
 144. See Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, [27] (discussing the 
concept of vulnerability); Harriton v Stephens (2006) 26 CLR 52 n.156 (same); 
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, [218] (same); Cole v S. 
Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd. (2004) 217 CLR 469, [106] 
(same). 
 145. See J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 934 (N.J. 1998) (imposing a duty on 
the wife of a child abuser to protect young girls who her husband abused). 
 146. The development of the elements of foreseeability in these cases into a 
rigid test as in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 839 (Cal. 1989), is, however, to 
be regretted. The flexible use of factors under a general duty rubric as in the 
English and Australian cases is to be preferred in putting the law on principled 
foundations. See Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 (Austl.); Annetts 
v Australian Stations Pty Ltd. (2002) 191 ALR 449, 505 (Austl.) (explaining that 
factors, such as causation or foreseeability, are not “themselves decisive of 
liability”). It is plain enough that the California Supreme Court in Thing was 
attempting to provide bright line tests to promote administrative efficiency, just 
as Flinn suggests her bright line test to preclude liability in take-home asbestos 
cases. 
 147. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 751–53 (discussing Congress’s several 
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be “the better angels”148 and act in aid of resolution of claims, but, 
in light of experience, the hope is dim. Most recently, trusts set 
up to compensate the victims of asbestos diseases faced the 
Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act 2013 (FACT),149 
which allowed asbestos companies to demand information from 
funds for any reason.150 Combating fraud has been put forward as 
the basis of the legislation. This is the kind of legislative rent-
seeking action that leaves little room for responsible 
Congressional initiatives designed to attack the issue so well 
described in the Note.151 The hard work will fall again to the 
courts, and Flinn’s Note will be a superb roadmap for courts 
tackling the latest instance of the asbestos wars. 
Efficiency and fairness favor a workers’ compensation type 
scheme that would deliver compensation. I have pointed out the 
waste in running asbestos claims through stressed courts and 
aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers.152 The social benefits of the tort 
litigation system in information revelation were delivered long 
ago. Now, in a world of mature claims, the question is how to 
compensate victims.153  
                                                                                                     
attempts to handle asbestos litigation). 
 148. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861). 
 149. H.R. 982, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 150. See id. (requiring trusts to publicly disclose information regarding the 
receipt and disposition of claims for injuries based on asbestos exposure).  
 151. For a detailed analysis of the operation of trusts set up as result of 
bankruptcy and tort claims, see DIXON, ET AL., supra note 25.  
 152. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial 
waste generated by asbestos litigation). 
 153. To be sure, compensation schemes have not fared well in the United 
States. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An 
Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform’s Impact on Businesses, Employment, and 
Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 257, 277–78 (2013) (discussing the failure of 
comprehensive federal tort reform). For example, nonfault motor vehicle 
accident schemes found favor in the 1970s despite their efficiency founder. See 
id. at 284 (stating that in the motor vehicle industry, products liability law 
developments had “no impact on passenger car-death rates between 1950 and 
1988”). Nonfault medical accidents schemes have fitful appearances in the 
legislative agenda. See, e.g., Joanna Shepherd-Bailey, Patient Injury Act 
Increases Patient Access to Justice, THE DAILY REPORT (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202620381111&slret
urn=20131016103555 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (discussing the Patient Injury 
Act, recently introduced to the Georgia Senate, which would “eliminate the 
state’s medical malpractice system and replace it with a no-blame, 
administrative model that compensates all patients who have been truly 
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With respect to mass torts, courts are stretched and pulled to 
arrive at satisfactory solutions. At one time, we worried that the 
integrity of the courts would suffer when put to the task of 
administering these large mass claims.154 Class actions bring in 
their wake huge devotion of judicial resources and compromises 
on the idea of individual justice.155 What we hope for is a 
partnership between courts and legislatures that recognizes the 
limits of courts’ institutional competence and willingness of 
legislatures to aid the task to bring fair and just resolution of 
claims. But the stakes are large, and public choice theory gives us 
little hope that the public good is a prime and independent value. 
Experience here, as Flinn recognizes, does not make one sanguine 
about the cooperation of the two arms of government. Law reform 
to cure the limitations of courts is rarely on display. She sees that 
state legislatures may reflect the policy imperatives of claims 
experiences in regions in the United States.156 Each state can act 
as a laboratory in exploring resolutions driven in part by a sense 
of the urgency of claims against the embattlement of asbestos 
producers. However, the stakes are big and the reach of self-
interest considerable. The reforms cited by Flinn are often to 
protect from liability those property owners whose residences 
contain asbestos. No doubt insurers are intent to limit liability of 
property owners, particularly if residential owners are often seen 
                                                                                                     
harmed”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also Joanna 
Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability 
System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151 (2014) (surveying the costs of defensive medicine). 
 154. See Goldberg, supra note 70, at 2034–50 (comparing Judge Jack 
Weinstein’s low damage amounts to tort law and distributive justice); Martha 
Minow, The Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of 
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2010–25 (1997) 
(describing Judge Jack Weinstein’s activist efforts to include all potentially 
affected parties in class litigation, calling it the “temporary administrative 
agency”); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. 
L. REV. 899, 899–930 (1996) (arguing that the rise of massive tort settlements 
mimics the development of public administrative agencies). 
 155. See Zipursky, supra note 94, at 1270 (“It does not seem consonant with 
current ideas of justice or morality that for an act of negligence, however slight 
or venial, which results in some trivial foreseeable trivial damage the actor 
should be liable for all consequences, however unforeseeable and however 
grave . . . .”). 
 156. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 755 (proposing that a state should respond 
to asbestos in the way that relates to that state’s experience with asbestos 
claims). 
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as poor loss bearers. The overhang of liability with respect to property 
is felt to be real if conveyances of property are encumbered.157 
Legislatures certainly may reflect exhaustively on the pros and cons 
of liability but are subject to blindness towards those interests not 
well represented in the lobbying market place. As I mentioned above, 
varying state liability systems bring their own uncertainties.158 The 
peace sought may not be easily gained. Instead, I offer a legislative 
scheme that does not preclude liability and does not attempt to 
import a compensation scheme.  
One modest reform would be along the lines of the Australian 
State of New South Wales. Under that state’s Dust Diseases Act,159 a 
tribunal is established to adjudicate claims for these diseases.160 Such 
legislation would be difficult to attack and would bring relief to hard-
pressed courts. If federal legislation were sought, a constitutional 
issue might arise, but the impact of asbestos on interstate trade may 
be sufficient to pass muster under the Commerce Clause. The great 
advantage of the tribunal would be its expertise in these claims and 
its ability as a repeat player to do justice across like-placed 
claimants.161 Flinn’s central issue of the extension of liability to take-
home claimants would still be a much debated matter that would find 
its way into the courts. Those courts, however, would have the 
advantage of growing adjudication within the tribunal that would be 
a firm guide to courts.  
                                                                                                     
 157. This is similar to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which places absolute liability on 
generators of hazardous substances on land. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.7 (2013). 
CERCLA’s standard of liability imposes significant burdens on land conveyance. 
See John Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN. L. REV. 
1493, 1494 (1994) (describing the standard of liability).  
 158. See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text (discussing the problems 
with state-specific solutions). 
 159. Dust Diseases Act 2005 (N.S.W.) (Austl.). 
 160. See id. (“An Act to provide more expeditious remedies for those 
suffering from disabilities resulting from exposure to dust; and for other 
purposes.”). 
 161. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, 
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. 
REV. 908, 975 (1989) (proposing tort reform that would allow for consistent 
recovery among plaintiffs). 
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V. Conclusion 
I hope that as policy makers and courts are seized again with 
the claims that Flinn’s Note focuses on, they will absorb the wisdom 
within her Note. Courts should be informed by her analysis of the 
duty of care and the scope of duty. It will, I anticipate, yield 
responses such as mine. Legislatures should visit reform with open 
eyes, seeking a partnership with courts in solving the problems 
presented by genuine claimants and hard-pressed defendants. 
Progress is uncertain where legislation is subject to the slings and 
arrows of interest groups’ influence, and we should not be overly 
sanguine about progress.162 But before we succumb to the Slough of 
Despond,163 we should bear in mind the remarkable success of tort’s 
remedial machine.  
Allow me to provide one reflection on how far we have come in 
the “few” years I have been teaching torts. At the Australian 
National University in the late 1970s, I was teaching a class and 
mentioned the emerging litigation on asbestos. After the class a 
student came to me and asked some questions. He had grown up in 
an asbestos mining town in the west of Australia. As a young boy, 
with his friends, he had played in the company-provided 
playground: instead of sand in the play area, the company had laid 
down blue asbestos. 
                                                                                                     
 162. Reform of adjectival law has fared badly in the United States because 
courts were left with the task of applying tort doctrines of damages as once-and-
for-all and limitation periods to the etiology of asbestos diseases. See, e.g., 
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales, 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Gideon 
could not split his cause of action and recover damages for asbestosis, then later 
sue for damages caused by such other pulmonary disease as might develop, then 
still later sue for cancer should cancer appear.”); Metro-N. Commuter v. 
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 438 (1997) (denying recovery for medical monitoring for 
future injuries resulting from asbestos exposure).  
Compare this with the active cooperation of the courts and Parliament 
elsewhere: Where the courts in the United Kingdom have found that the 
precursors to lung disease caused by asbestos had not blossomed into a 
cognizable injury, Parliament acted to redefine the conditions—for example, 
pleural plaques qualify as injuries. The statutes also address the problems in 
the limitation period caused where a condition remains undiscovered or 
undiscoverable. See Damages (Asbestos-Related Conditions) (No. 2) Bill, 2009-
10, H.L. Bill [31] (Eng.) (stating that someone suffering from pleural thickening 
would not have to prove causation to claim damages); Damages (Asbestos-
related Conditions) (Scotland) Act, 2009, (A.S.P. 4) (allowing actionable harm for 
asbestos-related pleural plaques); Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) Act 
(Northern Ireland), 2011, c. 28 (same). 
 163. See generally JOHN BUNYAN, PILGRIM’S PROGRESS (1678). 
